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New SIAI Paper on Utility Theory by Peter de Blanc

December 3rd, 2009Tom McCabe

Peter de Blanc (Temple University), an SIAI Visiting Fellow, has recently published the final version of his most recent paper, titled “Convergence of Expected Utility for Universal Artificial Intelligence“. The paper, based on earlier work in the field of expected utility theory by Marcus Hutter (Australian National University) and SIAI Research Fellow Eliezer Yudkowsky, proves mathematically that any unbounded, perception determined, computable utility function cannot assign a defined utility to any action, assuming a Solomonoff-like prior. The abstract of the paper is as follows:

“We consider a sequence of repeated interactions between an agent and an environment. Uncertainty about the environment is captured by a probability distribution over a space of hypotheses, which includes all computable functions. Given a utility function, we can evaluate the expected utility of any computational policy for interaction with the environment. After making some plausible assumptions (and maybe one not-so-plausible assumption), we show that if the utility function is unbounded, then the expected utility of any policy is undefined.”

Peter de Blanc has done research with the Singularity Institute since 2006, when he participated in the “Summer of AI” research program along with Nick Hay (UC Berkeley), Marcello Herreshoff (Stanford University) and Eliezer Yudkowsky. During the summer of 2009, he was a Singularity Institute Summer Fellow, helping SIAI researchers work on problems in the fields of Friendly AI, rationality and decision theory. His personal website, Space and Games, can be found at http://www.spaceandgames.com/.

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Comments (4) (RSS feed)

Toggle comment visibility Comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky
Dec 4, 2009 3:26 am

Some further clarification at:

http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Pascal%27s_mugging

“Peter de Blanc has proven that if an agent assigns a finite probability to all computable hypotheses (which probability may be computable, or computably bounded below) and assigns unboundedly large finite utilities over percept sequences (that is, the utilities are a direct function of sensory information, not over possible external universes that could be responsible for the sensory percepts; and these utilities are computable, or computably bounded below) then the sum in the expected utility formula does not converge.

Peter de Blanc’s paper, and the Pascal’s Mugging argument, are sometimes misinterpreted as showing that any agent with an unbounded finite utility function over outcomes is not consistent, but this has yet to be demonstrated.”

 
Toggle comment visibility Comment by Peter de Blanc
Dec 4, 2009 12:40 pm

The current version of the paper contains no mistakes that I know of, but it’s too early to call it the final version.

 
Dec 4, 2009 5:48 pm

[...] Cross-posted from SIAI blog: [...]

 
Toggle comment visibility Comment by Tim Tyler
Dec 9, 2009 5:57 am

Um: yuck. For one thing, why is the agent assumed to be summing infinite sequences in its utility function in the first place?

 

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